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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 68 
Accident time: 10:32 Accident Date: 26/04/1996 
Where it occurred: Calomanda Village, 
Huambo Province 
Country: Angola 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 30/04/1996 
ID original source: IC/JH/NN - internal Name of source: INAROEE 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PPM-2 AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
grass/grazing area 
Date record created: 23/01/2004 Date  last modified: 21/03/2006 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 3 
 
Map details 
Longitude: 15° 43' 42" E Latitude: 01° 12' 46" S 
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 




At the time of the accident the demining group were running two-man teams and a one-man 
drill. In this, the same deminer cuts undergrowth, uses the detector and excavates any finds.  
The demining group issued frontal protection and their drills assumed the deminer would 
kneel or squat while excavating. 
No report of this accident was found at the Angola MAC. However, an accident report was 
prepared by the UN for another accident that occurred on 27th June 1996 and in which this 
accident was mentioned. The document stated "about one month ago the same platoon have 
had a first accident when a deminer activated a mine with his prodder, without severe 
consequences". 
The demining group's country manager made an internal "preliminary" report available. The 
document was dated 29th April 1996 and the following summarises its content.  
The reports started by stating that the accident occurred at 10:02 at an "old military health 
post" [the time conflicts with other records]. The investigation began an hour after the 
accident. The victim was unable to give full details of his actions at that time. The demining 
team had worked at the site for three months and had cleared 2,700m2 and destroyed 405 
PPM-2 blast mines.  The vegetation in the area was "extremely thick" and three strands of 
barbed wire that had been part of the old fence had been cut back to prevent interference with 
detectors.  
At 10:05 the victim located a PPM-2 at the head of his lane. He called the Team Leader who 
marked the mine to be destroyed it at the end of the day. The victim and his partner then 
moved to another lane. When they changed roles (resting/demining) just before 10:30, the 
victim went back to the lane where he had found the mine. His partner saw that he had taken 
off his visor and shouted a warning to him. The victim ignored him and started probing a 
metre from the uncovered mine in the belief that a second mine had been laid there (as was 
normal for that mined area). He prodded onto a second mine and it detonated. He was blown 
back into the safe lane, got up and moved towards his partner. His injuries were all to his 
face.  
The Supervisor and the medic treated him within one minute of the accident, then took him to 
the Brazilian (UN) hospital, arriving there six minutes after the accident. The hospital said the 
victim had sustained "minor secondary blast damage to his face and eyes caused by fine 
particles of dust". They recommended he be taken to an eye surgeon in Luanda.  
Although "all agencies operating aircraft" offered to take the victim by air, the victim was 
driven to the Clinica Sagrada Espianca in Luanda, arriving "by" 17:50 and was seen by a 
specialist "within" an hour.  
The investigators found that the blast crater was 35cm wide and 30cm deep, and a metre 
outside the cleared area, following the expected pattern. They found fragments of a PPM-2 
[the other mine had been detonated by this time so finding parts may not have been relevant] 
and the victim's detector was working normally. His protective apron was undamaged but 
splattered with blood. His visor was undamaged. His probe had not been found when the 
report was written. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators decided that the deminer acted against the group's SOPs by returning to 
prod for the mine. The accident was probably "caused by bad drills…. He may have been 
probing at too steep an angle". It was recognised "that the mine may have been laid at an 
angle (this had been the case for about 20% of the mines found)" at the site. The 
investigators believed that the victim would have been unhurt if he had been wearing his 
visor. They said that the Team Leader was not at fault because he was 200m from the 
accident site [this appears to contradict his arrival at the accident within a minute] so was 
unable to see the deminer without his visor. Deminers had been told to report any 
infringements to the Team Leader but the victim's partner did not do this quickly enough. The 
investigation concluded that the medical and evacuation procedures went well but noted the 




The investigators recommended that deminers should be warned about not using protective 
equipment, and given regular retraining on the use of demining tools. Also, they 




Victim number: 97 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Long visor 
Short frontal vest 
Protection used: Short frontal vest 





No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was working improperly (including removing his visor) and his partner lacked the authority to 
correct him. The demining NGO involved claimed that all their field staff wore visors and vests 
at all times when in a mined area. 
The victim is presumed to have been squatting because the demining group approved 
squatting to prod and or excavate at the time. 
The demining group's failure to accept an offer of air CASEVAC and apparent ignorance of 
the facilities available locally raises questions about their competency and appears to a failure 




Additional information from an internal demining group document written on 30th April 1996 
stated that the victim's injuries had been confirmed as lacerations to both corneas. No other 
injuries were sustained. The eye specialist was confident that the victim would not lose his 
sight and would be able to return to Huambo on 1st May 1996. Daily washing and dressings 
of the eyes could be given by the UN field hospital.  
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